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Suitability Obligations Applicable to Securities and Annuities 
Christine Lazaro1 
Benjamin P. Edwards2 
 
Brokers are subject to different regulatory obligations depending 
on the type of product being recommended to a customer.  
Generally, brokers are subjected to overlapping oversight and are 
regulated at both the federal and state level.  This oversight 
becomes even further complicated when a broker sells a product 
that spans multiple regulatory schemes such as certain annuities, 
which may be both insurance and securities products. 
 
This article describes a broker’s suitability obligations under the 
new suitability rule when making recommendations which are 
covered by that rule.  Next, it describes the additional obligations 
that a broker has when making a recommendation of a variable 
annuity.  Last, it describes the obligations a broker has when 
recommending an equity-indexed annuity, which has sometimes 
been viewed as both a security and insurance and sometimes solely 
as an insurance product.   
 
I. Broker’s Obligations When Making Recommendations  
 
When doing business with retail customers, brokers and brokerage 
firms are governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“Exchange Act”) and the rules promulgated thereunder as well as 
by state statutes and regulations.  In addition, brokers and 
brokerage firms are regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”), a self-regulatory organization and are 
subject to the rules issued by FINRA.  
 
A. The Suitability Rule 
 
Brokers and brokerage firms must adhere to a suitability standard 
which is premised primarily on FINRA Rule 2111, and requires 
that a Broker have a reasonable basis for believing that a 
recommendation of a security or an investment strategy is 
                                                          
1 Christine Lazaro is an Associate Professor of Clinical Legal Education and Director of the 
Securities Arbitration Clinic at St. John’s University School of Law. 
2 Benjamin P. Edwards is the Director of the Investor Advocacy Clinic at Michigan State 
University College of Law. 
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“suitable” for a customer.  Rule 2111 replaced NASD Rule 2130, 
and went into effect on July 9, 2012.   
 
Rule 2111(a) provides that: 
 
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable 
basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment 
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the 
customer, based on the information obtained through the 
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to 
ascertain the customer's investment profile. A customer's 
investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the 
customer's age, other investments, financial situation and 
needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment 
experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk 
tolerance, and any other information the customer may 
disclose to the member or associated person in connection with 
such recommendation.3 
 
The Supplementary Materials to Rule 2111 set forth the general 
principles of the rule, which state:  
 
Implicit in all member and associated person relationships with 
customers and others is the fundamental responsibility for fair 
dealing. Sales efforts must therefore be undertaken only on a 
basis that can be judged as being within the ethical standards 
of FINRA rules, with particular emphasis on the requirement 
to deal fairly with the public. The suitability rule is 
fundamental to fair dealing and is intended to promote ethical 
sales practices and high standards of professional conduct.4 
 
There are three components to the suitability obligation set forth in 
Rule 2111, the reasonable-basis obligation; the customer-specific 
obligation; and quantitative suitability.   
 
                                                          
3.FINRA Rule 2111(a), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display main.html?rbid=2403&element id=9859.  (A 
“member” is a brokerage firm and an “associated person” is a Broker). 
4 FINRA Rule 2111.01. 
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Reasonable-basis suitability requires the broker to reasonably 
believe that the recommendation is suitable for at least some 
customers.5  Customer-specific suitability requires the broker to 
reasonably believe the recommendation is suitable for the 
particular customer.6  Lastly, quantitative suitability requires the 
broker, who has discretion or de facto control over the customer’s 
account, to reasonably believe that a series of recommended 
transactions are not excessive and unsuitable for a customer when 
taken together.7  
 
In drafting Rule 2111, FINRA for the first time explicitly included 
investment strategies within the ambit of the rule, and mandated 
that the term be read broadly to include explicit recommendations 
to hold securities.8   
 
B. Regulatory Notices on Suitability 
 
FINRA issued a series of regulatory notices to provide guidance to 
its members following the adoption of Rule 2111.  The regulatory 
notices presented a series of questions and answers, expanding the 
information provided through supplementary materials to the rule.   
 
In Regulatory Notice 11-25, FINRA answered the question, “What 
is the scope of the term ‘strategy’ as used in FINRA Rule 2111?”9  
FINRA responded that “the rule would cover a recommendation to 
purchase securities using margin or liquefied home equity or to 
engage in day trading, irrespective of whether the recommendation 
results in a transaction or references particular securities.”10   
 
FINRA also provided an example of the type of circumstance that 
would create an explicit recommendation to hold a security.  “The 
rule would apply, for example, when an associated person meets 
with a customer during a quarterly or annual investment review 
                                                          
5 See FINRA Rule 2111.05(a). 
6 See FINRA Rule 2111.05(b). 
7 See FINRA Rule 2111.05(c). 
8 See FINRA Rule 2111.03. 
9 See Regulatory Notice 11-25, “Know Your Customer and Suitability:  New 
Implementation Date for and Additional Guidance on the Consolidated FINRA Rules 
Governing Know-Your-Customer and Suitability Obligations,” Q7 & A7, p. 6, May 2011, 
available at http://finra.complinet.com/net file store/new rulebooks/f/i/finra 11-25.pdf.  
10 Id.  
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and explicitly advises the customer not to sell any securities in or 
make any changes to the account or portfolio.”11  However, 
FINRA made clear that the suitability obligation is not implicated 
by a broker remaining silent; and the rule does not create an 
ongoing duty to monitor the account.12 
 
FINRA issued a follow-up notice in May 2012, prior to the 
effective date of Rule 2111.  In Regulatory Notice 12-25, FINRA 
answered the question, “What does it mean to act in a customer’s 
best interests?”: 
 
In interpreting FINRA’s suitability rule, numerous cases 
explicitly state that “a broker’s recommendations must be 
consistent with his customers’ best interests.” The suitability 
requirement that a broker make only those recommendations 
that are consistent with the customer’s best interests prohibits a 
broker from placing his or her interests ahead of the 
customer’s interests. Examples of instances where FINRA and 
the SEC have found brokers in violation of the suitability rule 
by placing their interests ahead of customers’ interests include 
the following: 
 
► A broker whose motivation for recommending one 
product over another was to receive larger 
commissions. 
► A broker whose mutual fund recommendations 
were “designed ‘to maximize his commissions 
rather than to establish an appropriate portfolio’ 
for his customers.” 
► A broker who recommended “that his customers 
purchase promissory notes to give him money to 
use in his business.” 
► A broker who sought to increase his commissions 
by recommending that customers use margin so 
that they could purchase larger numbers of 
securities. 
► A broker who recommended new issues being 
pushed by his firm so that he could keep his job. 
                                                          
11 Id.  
12 Id.; see also Q8 & A8. 
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► A broker who recommended speculative securities 
that paid high commissions because he felt 
pressured by his firm to sell the securities. 
 
The requirement that a broker’s recommendation must be 
consistent with the customer’s best interests does not obligate 
a broker to recommend the “least expensive” security or 
investment strategy (however “least expensive” may be 
quantified), as long as the recommendation is suitable and the 
broker is not placing his or her interests ahead of the 
customer’s interests.  
 
Some of the cases in which FINRA and the SEC have found 
that brokers placed their interests ahead of their customers’ 
interests involved cost-related issues. However, the cost 
associated with a recommendation is ordinarily only one of 
many important factors to consider when determining whether 
the subject security or investment strategy involving a security 
or securities is suitable.  For example, the customer’s 
investment profile is critical to the assessment, as are a host of 
product or strategy-related factors such as the product’s or 
strategy’s investment objectives, characteristics (including any 
special or unusual features), liquidity, risks and potential 
benefits, volatility and likely performance in a variety of 
market and economic conditions. These are all important 
considerations in analyzing the suitability of a particular 
recommendation, which is why the suitability rule and the 
concept that a broker’s recommendation must be consistent 
with the customer’s best interests are inextricably 
intertwined.13 
                                                          
13 FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, “Suitability: Additional Guidance on FINRA’s New 
Suitability Rule,” Q1 & A1, pp. 3-4, May 2012 (internal citations and footnotes omitted), 
available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p126431.
pdf.  The following cases were cited by FINRA:  Raghavan Sathianathan, Exchange Act 
Rel. No. 54722, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2572, at *21 (Nov. 8, 2006); Scott Epstein, Exchange Act 
Rel. No. 59328, 2009 SEC LEXIS 217, at *40 n.24 (Jan. 30, 2009) (“In interpreting the 
suitability rule, we have stated that a [broker’s] ‘recommendations must be consistent with 
his customer’s best interests.’”); Dane S. Faber, 57 S.E.C. 297, 310, 2004 SEC LEXIS 277, 
at *23-24 (2004) (stating that a “broker’s recommendations must be consistent with his 
customer’s best interests” and are “not suitable merely because the customer acquiesces in 
[them]”); Wendell D. Belden, 56 S.E.C. 496, 503, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1154, at *11 (2003) 
(“As we have frequently pointed out, a broker’s recommendations must be consistent with 
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In terms of defining “recommendation” under the new rule, 
FINRA stated that its and the SEC’s prior guidance and 
interpretations remain generally applicable.14   
 
FINRA answered who a customer is for purposes of the suitability 
rule stating, “a ‘customer’ clearly would include an individual or 
entity with whom a broker-dealer has even an informal business 
relationship related to brokerage services, as long as that individual 
or entity is not a broker or dealer.”15  FINRA made clear that the 
suitability obligation applied to potential investors.16  
 
FINRA also explained the scope of the reasonable-basis suitability 
obligation.  It is not sufficient that the investment be suitable for 
some investors: 
 
The reasonable-basis obligation is critically important because, 
in recent years, securities and investment strategies that 
brokers recommend to customers, including retail investors, 
have become increasingly complex and, in some cases, risky. 
Brokers cannot fulfill their suitability responsibilities to 
customers (including both their reasonable-basis and customer-
specific obligations) when they fail to understand the securities 
and investment strategies they recommend.17 
 
                                                                                                                       
his customer’s best interests.”); Daniel R. Howard, 55 S.E.C. 1096, 1100, 2002 SEC LEXIS 
1909, at *5-6 (2002) (same), aff’d, 77 F. App’x 2 (1st Cir. 2003); Powell & McGowan, Inc., 
41 S.E.C. 933, 935, 1964 SEC LEXIS 497, at *3-4 (1964) (same); Dep’t of Enforcement v. 
Evans, No. 20006005977901, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 36, at *22 (NAC Oct. 3, 2011) 
(same); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Cody, No. 2005003188901, 2010 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 8, 
at *19 (NAC May 10, 2010) (same), aff’d, Exchange Act Rel. No. 64565, 2011 SEC LEXIS 
1862 (May 27, 2011); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Bendetsen, No. C01020025, 2004 NASD 
Discip. LEXIS 13, at *12 (NAC Aug. 9, 2004) (“[A] broker’s recommendations must serve 
his client’s best interests, and the test for whether a broker’s recommendations are suitable 
is not whether the client acquiesced in them, but whether the broker’s recommendations 
were consistent with the client’s financial situation and needs.”); Robin B. McNabb, 54 
S.E.C. 917, 928, 2000 SEC LEXIS 2120, at *24 (2000), aff’d, 298 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
1990); Stephen T. Rangen, 52 S.E.C. 1304, 1311, 1997 SEC LEXIS 762, at *19 (1997); 
Curtis I. Wilson, 49 S.E.C. 1020, 1022, 1989 SEC LEXIS 25, at *6-7 (1989), aff’d, 902 
F.2d 1580 (9th Cir. 1990). 
14 Id. at Q2 & A2 and Q3 & A3, pp. 4-5.  
15 Id. at Q6 & A6, p. 6 (emphasis in the original).  
16 Id. 
17 Id. at Q22 & A22, p. 14. 
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With respect to quantitative suitability, FINRA provided guidance 
that the standards that established excessive trading under the 
predecessor rule continue to provide a basis for establishing that 
recommendations may be quantitatively unsuitable under the new 
rule – turnover rate, cost-to-equity ratio, and in-and-out trading of 
an account.18 
 
In December 2012, FINRA issued Regulatory Notice 12-55 to 
clarify the scope of the terms “customer” and “investment 
strategy” as discussed in Regulatory Notice 12-25.19   
 
In this notice, FINRA issued revised answers to the question, who 
is a customer?  Now, FINRA defined a customer to include “a 
person who is not a broker or dealer who opens a brokerage 
account at a broker-dealer or purchases a security for which the 
broker-dealer receives or will receive, directly or indirectly, 
compensation even though the security is held at an issuer, the 
issuer’s affiliate or a custodial agent (e.g., “direct application” 
business, “investment program” securities, or private placements), 
or using another similar arrangement.”20   
 
With respect to potential investors, the suitability obligation would 
only apply if the person becomes a customer.  “Where, for 
example, a registered representative makes a recommendation to 
purchase a security to a potential investor, the suitability rule 
would apply to the recommendation if that individual executes the 
transaction through the broker-dealer with which the registered 
representative is associated or the broker-dealer receives or will 
receive, directly or indirectly, compensation as a result of the 
recommended transaction.”21   
 
FINRA also clarified that the suitability rule applies only to 
securities transactions and not to recommendations related to non-
                                                          
18 Id. at Q23 & A23, p. 14. 
19 See FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-55, “Suitability:  Additional Guidance on FINRA’s 
New Suitability Rule,” December 2012, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/net file store/new rulebooks/f/i/FINRANotice12 55.pdf.  
20 Id. at Q6(a) & A6(a), p. 2.  
21 Id. at Q6(b) & A6(b), p. 2 (emphasis in the original). 
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securities transactions such as might arise in outside business 
activities.22 
 
II. Broker’s Obligations When Recommending Annuities  
 
Annuities pose a unique issue with respect to suitability 
obligations.  Certain annuities, e.g. fixed annuities, are not 
securities and hence, the FINRA suitability obligation does not 
apply to the recommendation to purchase a fixed annuity.  Other 
annuities, e.g. variable annuities, are securities and the FINRA 
suitability obligations clearly apply.  However, there are a third 
category of annuities, equity-indexed annuities, which may or may 
not be securities. 
 
A. Suitability and Variable Annuities 
 
In addition to Rule 2111, FINRA Rule 2330 also applies to sales of 
variable annuities.23   
 
Rule 2330 outlines a broker’s responsibilities regarding deferred 
variable annuities.  In addition to complying with the suitability 
obligations set forth in Rule 2111, the broker has further 
obligations.  Specifically, the broker must have a reasonable basis 
to believe that “the customer has been informed, in general terms, 
of various features of deferred variable annuities, such as the 
potential surrender period and surrender charge; potential tax 
penalty if customers sell or redeem deferred variable annuities 
before reaching the age of 59½; mortality and expense fees; 
investment advisory fees; potential charges for and features of 
riders; the insurance and investment components of deferred 
variable annuities; and market risk.”24 
                                                          
22 Id. at Q10(a) & A10(a), p. 4. 
23 “Deferred variable annuities have many unique features that make them complex 
investments. In addition to the hybrid nature of deferred variable annuities (i.e., they contain 
both securities and insurance features), most deferred variable annuities offer numerous 
choices among a number of complex contract features.6 Moreover, the amount that will 
accumulate and be paid to the investor pursuant to a deferred variable annuity will fluctuate 
depending on the investment options that the investor chooses.”  See NASD Notice to 
Members 04-45, “Proposed Rule Governing the Purchase, Sale, or Exchange of Deferred 
Variable Annuities,” June 2004, available at 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p003009.pdf. 
24 FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(A)(i). 
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In addition to ensuring that the customer has received material 
information about the variable annuity, the broker must have a 
reasonable basis to believe “the customer would benefit from 
certain features of deferred variable annuities, such as tax-deferred 
growth, annuitization, or a death or living benefit.”25  The broker 
also has to believe the annuity as a whole, including the underlying 
subaccounts to which money has been allocated, as well as riders 
and product enhancements, are suitable for the customer.26  
 
The rule also requires that a broker make a suitability 
determination with respect to annuity exchanges, and requires the 
broker to consider whether “the customer would incur a surrender 
charge, be subject to the commencement of a new surrender 
period, lose existing benefits (such as death, living, or other 
contractual benefits), or be subject to increased fees or charges 
(such as mortality and expense fees, investment advisory fees, or 
charges for riders and similar product enhancements).”27  Again, 
the broker should consider whether the customer would benefit 
from product enhancements and improvements.28  The broker must 
also consider whether any other deferred variable annuities had 
been exchanged in the preceding 36 months.29   
 
Like Rule 2111, Rule 2330 also sets forth the type of information a 
broker should obtain from a customer prior to making a 
recommendation:  “information concerning the customer's age, 
annual income, financial situation and needs, investment 
experience, investment objectives, intended use of the deferred 
variable annuity, investment time horizon, existing assets 
(including investment and life insurance holdings), liquidity needs, 
liquid net worth, risk tolerance, tax status, and such other 
information used or considered to be reasonable by the member or 
person associated with the member in making recommendations to 
customers.”30 
 
                                                          
25 FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
26 See FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
27 FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(B)(i). 
28 See FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
29 See FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
30 FINRA Rule 2330(b)(2). 
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Although this rule applies to deferred variable annuities, it does 
not apply to fixed annuities or equity-indexed annuities.     
 
B. Defining Equity-Indexed Annuities 
 
Insurance companies quietly introduced a new breed of annuity, 
the equity-indexed annuity, in the mid-1990s.31  These products 
credit contract owners with returns based on the performance of 
some index, such as the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average.  Because the products were most often tied to equity 
market indexes, they were first known as equity-indexed annuities.  
The products share characteristics with both fixed and variable 
annuities.32  Like a fixed annuity, equity-indexed annuities may 
offer a minimum guaranteed interest rate and, under state 
insurance law, the insurance company will generally guarantee a 
certain portion of the premium paid.33  Like a variable annuity, the 
rate of return for an equity-indexed annuity will vary based on the 
performance of a securities index, such as the S&P 500.34 
 
Unlike variable annuities, however, equity-indexed annuities 
typically do not diminish in value if a market index declines in 
value over a set period.35  If the relevant index goes down during 
the relevant time period, no deduction is taken from the value of 
the annuity.36  In exchange for this downside protection, some 
equity-indexed annuities cap the amount that may be earned when 
the index’s value goes up.37  For example, if an index increased 
6% in a year, the equity-indexed annuity might only permit a 
maximum rate of return of 5%.  Forecasting anticipated returns 
                                                          
31 See “Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts”, Securities Act Release 
Nos. 33-8996, 34-59221, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138-01, p. 8, Jan. 8, 2009. The product has also 
been known as a fixed indexed annuity. For ease of reference, this Article refers to the 
product as an “equity-indexed annuity.”  
32.See FINRA, “Equity-Indexed Annuities: A Complex Choice”, last updated 2010, 
available at http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/equity-indexed-annuities a-complex-
choice, see also SEC, “Investor Bulletin:  Indexed Annuities”, April 2011, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/secindexedannuities.pdf.  
33 See FINRA, “Equity-Indexed Annuities: A Complex Choice.”  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
11 
 
may be difficult because the insurance companies selling equity-
indexed annuities may reserve the right to alter the formulas by 
which the investor’s gains will be calculated.38  
 
Insurance companies for the most part have quietly sold equity-
indexed annuities since their introduction in the mid-1990s without 
registering them as securities.39   
 
C. Regulating Equity-Indexed Annuities 
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Securities Act”) 
expressly exempts annuities from coverage of the Act, stating that 
the provisions of the Act do not apply to “[a]ny . . . annuity 
contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation 
subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank 
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, 
of any State or Territory of the United States or the District of 
Columbia.”40  Notwithstanding this explicit language, the Supreme 
Court first considered what Congress intended when it included 
the term “annuity contract” in the Securities Act in 1959 in SEC v. 
VALIC.41  In VALIC, the Court considered whether a variable 
annuity was exempt from the Securities Act, and held that it was 
not exempt. 
 
At the time VALIC was decided, variable annuities were new 
products.  Because the first variable annuity contracts appeared in 
1952,42 they did not exist when the Securities Act was adopted in 
1933.  The Court had to decide what Congress meant when it used 
the term “annuity” in the Securities Act, at a time when only fixed 
annuities had existed.43  States treated variable annuities 
                                                          
38 Crediting formulas typically limit the amount of interest credited by imposing a variety of 
terms. A “participation rate,” for example, limits the investor to a certain percentage of the 
index’s performance. Some equity-indexed annuities may also cap the amount of interest an 
investor may receive in any given year. See Id. 
39 See “Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts”, Securities Act Release 
Nos. 33-8996, 34-59221, File No. S7-14-08, p. 9, January 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-8996.pdf.  
40 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8). 
41 See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). 
42 Id. at 69. 
43 See id. at 69. 
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inconsistently, with some states treating variable annuities as 
insurance and others not.44  The Court examined the characteristics 
of the variable annuity contracts to determine whether they shared 
traditional insurance characteristics.45  Historically, the annuities 
that had been regulated under the insurance laws had been fixed 
annuities, which did share the traits of traditional insurance 
products.46  The Court concluded that “the concept of ‘insurance’ 
involves investment risk-taking on the part of the company.”47  
Nevertheless, “absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable 
annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on 
the company.”48  Accordingly, the Court held that variable 
annuities were not exempted from the Securities Act.49 
 
Over time, the insurance companies continued to develop new 
annuity products.  In 1967, the Supreme Court was asked to decide 
whether a flexible-fund annuity was subject to the Securities Act in 
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.50  The flexible-fund annuity 
was an optional annuity plan which was similar to a variable 
annuity.51  In this case, the Court focused less on the shifting of 
risk and more on “the character the instrument is given in 
commerce.”52  The Court examined how the flexible funds were 
being sold to consumers and found that flexible funds were 
competing with mutual funds and being sold to consumers under 
the same value proposition of growth and professional 
management as mutual funds.53  In the view of the Court, “[i]t 
seems eminently fair that a purchaser of such a plan be afforded 
the same advantages of disclosure which inure to a mutual fund 
purchaser under §5 of the Securities Act.”54  Thus, the Court held 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 71–73. 
46 Id. at 69. 
47 Id. at 71. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 73. 
50 SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967). 
51 Id. at 204. 
52 Id. at 211. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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that the annuities were not exempt annuity contracts under the 
Securities Act.55 
 
In the mid-1980s, the SEC promulgated Rule 151 to create a safe 
harbor definition of annuity contracts or optional annuity contract 
under §3(a)(8) of the Securities Act for new products entering the 
market.56  The rule was meant to ensure guaranteed investment 
contracts were exempt from the definition as long as certain 
conditions were met.  Rule 151 codified the Court’s holdings in 
VALIC and United Benefit by specifying that the insurance 
company must assume the investment risk under the contract and 
that marketing the annuity as an investment will forfeit the 
Securities Act exemption.57 
 
In 2008, the SEC sought to regulate equity-indexed annuities by 
proposing Rule 151A, which would make it clear that the products 
fell outside the safe harbor of Rule 151 and within the SEC’s 
jurisdiction.58  In 2009, the SEC’s rulemaking process concluded 
and it adopted Rule 151A, which excluded from the definition of 
“annuity contracts or optional annuity contracts,” a contract if: 
 
(1) The contract specifies that amounts payable by the issuer 
under the contract are calculated at or after the end of one or 
more specified crediting periods, in whole or in part, by 
reference to the performance during the crediting period or 
periods of a security, including a group or index of securities; 
and 
(2) Amounts payable by the issuer under the contract are more 
likely than not to exceed the amounts guaranteed under the 
contract.59 
 
Shortly after the SEC adopted Rule 151A, American Equity 
Investment Life Insurance Co. challenged the rule in the United 
                                                          
55 Id. at 212.  
56 17 C.F.R. § 230.151. 
57 Id.  
58 See “Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts”, Securities Act Release 
Nos. 33-8933, 34-58022; File No. S7-14-08, June 25, 2008, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8933.pdf.  
59 17 CFR § 230.151A (a)(1)–(2).  
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States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.60  Although the court 
held that the SEC had reasonably interpreted the exclusion for 
“annuity contracts” as not exempting equity-indexed annuities, it 
vacated the rule because the SEC had “failed to properly consider 
the effect of the rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”61 
 
Removing doubt that equity-indexed annuities could be regulated 
under the Securities Act, the court found that equity-indexed 
annuities were more like securities than annuities that traditionally 
benefited from the § 3(a)(8) exemption.62  Retail customers who 
purchased equity-indexed annuities did not know their annual 
returns until the end of the year resulting in variability in potential 
return and risk.63  As the court noted, “[b]y contrast, an annuity 
contract falling under Rule 151’s exemption avoids this variability 
by guaranteeing the interest rate ahead of time.”64   
 
Following the court’s decision, Congress weighed in on the matter 
when it enacted Dodd-Frank.65  Title IX, Section 989J, also known 
as the Harkin Amendment, directs the SEC to treat certain annuity 
contracts as exempt securities under the Securities Act if certain 
conditions are met.  This exemption covers equity-indexed 
annuities as long as: 
 
(1) the value of the indexed annuity does not vary according to 
the performance of a separate account; . . . and 
 
(3) the indexed annuity is issued in a state that has adopted the 
Model Suitability Regulation or by an insurer that adopts and 
implements practices on a nationwide basis for the sale of 
annuity contracts that meet or exceed the NAIC Model 
Suitability Regulation.66 
                                                          
60 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
61 Id. at 176, 179. 
62 Id. at 174. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989J, 124 Stat. 1376, 1949-50 (2010). 
66 Fed. Ins. Office, “How to Modernize and Improve the System of Insurance Regulation in 
the United States”, p. 52, 2013. 
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D. The NAIC Model Suitability Regulation 
 
In 2000, NAIC67 drafted a white paper recommending the 
establishment of suitability standards for life insurance and 
annuities.68  At the time, six states had broad suitability standards 
for annuity products.69  These states prohibited brokers from 
recommending a product with reasonable grounds to believe the 
product was unsuitable for the customer.70  Some states provided 
guidance on how to determine suitability, basing it on an inquiry 
into criteria such as the customer’s objectives, financial situation, 
and needs.71  Yet most states lacked suitability requirements.72  
After drafting the white paper, NAIC also appointed a working 
group to draft a model act and regulation.73  
 
An early draft of the model regulation applied only to the sale of 
annuities to seniors, resulting in the “Senior Protection in Annuity 
Transactions Model Regulation.”74  In 2006, NAIC expanded the 
scope of the model regulation to apply to all annuity transactions, 
and it was renamed the Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model 
Regulation (the “Model Regulation”).75 
                                                          
67 “The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is the U.S. standard-
setting and regulatory support organization created and governed by the chief insurance 
regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories. Through the 
NAIC, state insurance regulators establish standards and best practices, conduct peer 
review, and coordinate their regulatory oversight. NAIC staff supports these efforts and 
represents the collective views of state regulators domestically and internationally. NAIC 
members, together with the central resources of the NAIC, form the national system of 
state-based insurance regulation in the U.S.”  See About the NAIC, 
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm. 
68 NAIC, “Suitability of Sales of Life Insurance and Annuities”, June 2000, (“NAIC White 
Paper”], available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/SOS-LI.pdf.  See also, NAIC, 
“Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation”, LH-275-1, April 2010, (NAIC 
Model Regulation), available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-275.pdf.  
69 See e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-15.8 (2011); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-2-14(c)(5) 
(2014); MINN. STAT. § 60K.14 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 72A.20 (2014); WIS. ADMIN. CODE 
INS. § 2.16(6) (2014). NAIC White Paper, at 10–14. 
70 NAIC White Paper, at 11–14. 
71 Id. 
72 NAIC Model Regulation, at LH-275-1. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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The Model Regulation resembles the FINRA suitability standard.  
It requires that a broker have “reasonable grounds for believing 
that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer on the basis 
of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or her investments 
and other insurance products and as to his or her financial situation 
and needs, including the consumer’s suitability information.”76  In 
addition, the broker must have a reasonable basis for believing that 
the consumer has received specific information about the annuity, 
and that particular aspects of the annuity are suitable for the 
consumer.77  The Model Regulation defines “suitability 
information” to include the following: (1) age; (2) annual income; 
(3) financial situation and needs, including the financial resources 
used for the funding of the annuity; (4) financial experience; (5) 
financial objectives; (6) intended use of the annuity; (7) financial 
time horizon; (8) existing assets, including investment and life 
insurance holdings; (9) liquidity needs; (10) liquid net worth; (11) 
risk tolerance; and (12) tax status.78 
 
There is substantial variation in the adoption of the Model 
Regulation.  Some states have adopted the duties found in the 
Model Regulation.79  Several states have adopted the duties found 
in a prior version of the Model Regulation, which define the 
information that must be considered in determining the suitability 
                                                          
76 NAIC Model Regulation, § 6.A. 
77 Id. § 6.A(1)–(4). 
78 Id. § 5.I 
79 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 26.775 (2011); CAL. INS. CODE § 10509.914 (West 2011); 
COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-4:4-1-11 (2011); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-432a-5 (2012); 
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 26-A, § 8403 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4554 (West 2013); 2012-
9 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 608-610 (LexisNexis); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 
18.01.09.015 (2013); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 3120.50 (2011); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 
191-15.75(507B) (2012); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-1-14a (2013); 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 
12:120 (2012); MD. CODE REGS. 31.09.12.04 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.4155 
(West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.2032 (West 2013); 19-2 MISS. CODE R. § 18.06 
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-8106 (2012); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-59A.3 (2013); 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 224.4 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-34.2-03 
(2011); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3901-6-13 (2011); OR. ADMIN. R. 836-080-0180 (2011); 11-5 
R.I. CODE R. § 12:6; S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 69-29 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33A-
16 (2012); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1115.051 (West 2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 590-
230 (2012); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-23-390 (2012); W. VA. CODE R. § 114-11B-5 
(2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 628-347 (West 2012). 
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of the transaction less specifically and require less disclosure about 
the annuity.80  One state adopted the original version of the Model 
Regulation as it applied only to senior consumers,81 and other 
states have adopted some variation of a suitability standard.82  
Only New Mexico has not adopted any suitability standards to 
govern annuity sales.83 
 
The Harkin Amendment assumed that by June 16, 2013, states 
would have adopted the Model Regulation.  However, as outlined 
above, only about two-thirds of the states have done so.  Presently, 
it is unclear whether the SEC will seek to exercise regulatory 
responsibility over equity-indexed annuities in those states that 
have not adopted the Model Regulation. 
 
While the sale of an equity-indexed annuity would likely be 
subject to the Model Regulation as opposed to FINRA Rule 2111, 
FINRA has made it clear the other transactions in connection with 
the recommendation of equity-indexed annuity may be subject to 
FINRA Rule 2111.  “Moreover, all recommendations to liquidate 
or surrender a registered security such as a mutual fund, variable 
annuity, or variable life contract must be suitable, including where 
such liquidations or surrender are for the purpose of funding the 
purchase of an unregistered [Equity Indexed Annuity].”84 
 
                                                          
80 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 482-1-137-.06 (2006); 054-00-082 ARK. CODE R. § 6 (LexisNexis 
2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1243.03 (LexisNexis 2014); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-
94.06 (2006); 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-72-4 (2009); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 11711 
(2014); 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 96.06 (2014); 02-031-917 ME. CODE R. § 6 (2007); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §33-20-805 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-60-170 (2009); N.H. CODE ADMIN. 
R. ANN. Ins. 305.05 (2009); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:25-17-7 (2006); 40 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 627-3 (2010); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0780-01-86-.06 (2008); 14 VA. 
ADMIN. CODE § 5-45-40 (2007). 
81 18 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 1214-6.0 (2014). 
82 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §4724(16) (2007); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 700-1.146 
(2007); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 688A.455 (2006); 44-27 WYO. CODE R. § 11 (LexisNexis 
1996). 
83 The NAIC tracks adoption of the Model Regulation, and its information indicates that 
New Mexico has not adopted the Model Regulation. NAIC Model Regulation, at LH-275-6.  
84 See NASD Notice to Members 05-50, “Equity-Indexed Annuities:  Member 
Responsibilities for Supervising Sales of Unregistered Equity-Indexed Annuities,” p. 5, 
August 2005, available at 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p014821.pdf.  
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III. Conclusion 
 
This article contains an overview of some of the regulations that 
may apply when Brokers recommend that their clients purchase 
securities or different types of annuities.  For cases involving 
annuities, much depends on the particular type of annuity at issue.  
While the general suitability rule laid out in FINRA Rule 2111 
applies to transactions involving securities, additional FINRA or 
state-specific regulations may apply if a broker recommends a 
variable annuity or an equity-indexed annuity. 
 
